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A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.: His Use 
of Scientific Evidence in Constitutional Adjudication 
Dean M. Hashimoto· 
Upon retirement after the end of the last Supreme Court term, Jus-
tice William J. Brennan, Jr. took his deserved and indisputable place in 
history among the great justices who have served on the United States 
Supreme Court. Like Chief Justice John Marshall, he not only left his 
mark but actually transformed constitutional law during his thirty-four 
year tenure. Just as Chief Justice Marshall established the power of the 
federal judiciary, Justice Brennan shaped the federal judiciary's protec-
tion of human rights. 
Justice Brennan was the intellectual genius of the Warren Court 
who gave a whole new meaning to the concept of civil liberty. During 
1964, at the zenith of the Warren Court, he wrote twenty-four opinions 
for the Court and no dissents. When asked what opinions are most sig-
nificant, he frequently mentions New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1 Baker 
v. Carr,2 and Goldberg v. Kelly.3 These are the seminal modem cases in 
the areas of freedom of speech, right to vote, and procedural due process. 
He contributed in many other areas, including gender discrimina-
tion, the takings clause, and free exercise of religion. Justice Brennan 
transformed constitutional law to reflect a vision of society in which lib-
erty and human dignity are sacrosanct. He must be ranked among the 
few justices whose philosophies shaped the constitutional law of their 
times, including Chief Justices Marshall and Hughes and Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis. 
During his term on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, Justice Bren-
nan further expanded his constitutional views through opinions and dis-
sents. He became the greatest dissenter and the only justice to have 
made significant contributions as a writer both for the Court and in dis-
sent. The persuasive quality of these dissents is demonstrated by either 
subsequent reversal by the Court or corrective legislation by Congress. 
I had the honor of serving as a law clerk for Justice Brennan during 
the 1987 October term. That term was but a thin cross section of his 
judicial career; however, it may serve as an example of his work in the 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College; Adjunct Assistant Professor of Occupational 
Medicine, Harvard University; A.B., Stanford University 1976; M.D., University of California, San 
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1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In defamation claims brought by a public official, the official must 
prove that the false statement was made with actual malice. Id. at 279. 
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). By rejecting the political question barrier, the Court expanded juris-
diction over the issue of one-person, one-vote. Id. at 209. 
3. 397 U.S. 254 (1979). The Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing 
before termination of welfare benefits. Id. at 261. 
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1980s. There were at least four important opinions that he wrote for the 
Court during that term: United States v. Paradise,4 School Board v. Ar-
line,S Johnson v. Transportation Agency,6 and Edwards v. Aguillard.7 
But, in my opinion, it was his dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp, 8 that history 
will record as his most significant writing of that term. 
As a law clerk, I had a particular interest in Edwards and McCles-
key because they involved issues of law and science. I had trained as a 
physician before attending the Yale Law School and also continued spe-
cialized training in occupational and environmental medicine at Harvard 
hospitals just before and after my clerkship with Justice Brennan. This 
medical training included the study of epidemiology, which is the empiri-
cal science upon which modern medicine is based. When I applied for a 
Supreme Court clerkship, at least one Justice expressed skepticism as to 
the worth of my combined training. But I remember that Justice Bren-
nan, on the first day that I was his law clerk, appeared quite interested in 
my medical background. He recalled that Justice Douglas had once 
hired a chemist-who had no legal training-to work on intellectual 
property cases. He seemed pleased that he was establishing an otherwise 
new precedent in clerk-hiring. Justice Brennan's fascination for science 
and technology in general, and medicine in particular, was occasionally 
reflected in his opinions. 
His respect for science and education was apparent in Edwards v. 
Aguillard. 9 The case involved a Louisiana statute that prohibited the 
teaching of evolution in public elementary and secondary schools unless 
accompanied by instruction in the theory of "creation science." Neither 
evolution nor creation science was statutorily required to be taught, how-
ever, if one theory was presented, the statute required the inclusion of the 
other theory. It defined the theories as "the scientific evidences for [crea-
tion or evolution] and inferences from those scientific evidences."lo 
The Court in Edwards held that the Louisiana statute violated the 
establishment clause because it served a religious purpose. In the opinion 
for the Court, Justice Brennan noted that the statute must be considered 
in its historical context. As in Epperson v. Arkansas, II the statute was a 
4. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). Race-conscious relief was justified by the compelling governmental 
interest in eradicating the history of discriminatory hiring of state troopers. [d. at 170. 
5. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). At a time when the AIDS epidemic was becoming a national concern, 
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was interpreted to apply to contagious diseases. [d. at 284. 
6. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Affirmative action for women based on a prior violation of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was allowed. [d. at 641. 
7. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). A Louisiana state law requiring the teaching of creation science in the 
public schools was determined to violate the establishment clause. [d. at 589. 
8. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The Georgia capital sentencing process was held constitutional de-
spite an empirical study indicating the sentencing determinations included racial considerations. [d. 
at 290. 
9. 482 U.S. 578. 
10. [d. at 589-93. 
11. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
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product of fundamentalist religious fervor that viewed the theory of 
evolution as contradicting the literal interpretation of the Book of Gene-
sis. The purpose of presenting "scientific evidence" to public school chil-
dren to support creation science was to tailor the curriculum to the 
teachings of this particular religious group.12 
In addition to emphasizing the historical context of the statute, Jus-
tice Brennan noted that the particular teaching arrangement itself was 
not neutral from a religious standpoint. The Louisiana statute required 
that scientific evidences supporting a single, particular religious view-
point be juxtaposed against scientific evidences supporting the theory of 
evolution or else neither could be taught. Justice Brennan suggested that 
if teaching a diversity of scientific theories examining the origins of hu-
mankind was required in order to enhance the teaching effectiveness of 
science instruction, this might well be valid under the establishment 
clause. \3 
Justice Brennan emphasized the importance of the context of scien-
tific evidence in determining whether it had a religious function. This 
view recognizes that scientific evidence is no different than other types of 
evidence in that it may be used to support and endorse a particular reli-
gious viewpoint and does not possess an inherently secular quality. The 
unique characteristic of scientific evidence that was, however, relevant in 
Edwards was the fact that our society often finds scientific evidence to be 
of higher persuasive quality than other kinds of evidence. Thus, requir-
ing schoolteachers to support a particular religious viewpoint with scien-
tific evidence was, in part, an endorsement of religion because of the 
authoritative nature of scientific evidence. 
This recognition of the value of scientific evidence and the impor-
tance of considering it contextually were also themes in the dissent by 
Justice Brennan in McCleskey v. Kemp.14 The petitioner in that case 
challenged the Georgia capital sentencing process as violative of the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments because it was operated in a racially 
discriminatory manner. In support of the claim, the petitioner relied on 
the Baldus study, a large empirical study that showed a disparity in the 
imposition of the death penalty based on the murder victim's race, and, 
to a lesser extent, on the defendant's race. The study considered 230 
nonracial factors that might legitimately influence a sentencer, but con-
cluded that the jury more. likely than not would have spared the peti-
tioner's life had his victim been black. IS 
In dismissing the eighth amendment claim, the McCleskey Court 
assumed the validity of the Baldus study and acknowledged that the peti-
12. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589-93. 
13. [d. at 593-94. 
14. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
15. [d. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
HeinOnline -- 30 Washburn L.J. 194 1990-1991
194 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 30 
tioner showed a risk that racial prejudice played a role in his sentencing. 
It nonetheless concluded that the probability of prejudice was insufficient 
to find a constitutional violation. The Court emphasized that it was im-
possible to prove the influence of race on any particular sentencing deci-
sion based on the Baldus study.16 
In his eloquent dissent, Justice Brennan addressed these issues in the 
context of his eighth amendment analysis. He reviewed past precedent 
and concluded that defendants challenging their death sentences had not 
previously needed to demonstrate that impermissible considerations were 
the "but for" cause or "cause in fact" of their sentencing decisions. In-
stead, the Court had required that defendants show that the system 
under which they were sentenced posed a significant risk of such an oc-
currence. 17 Justice Brennan further noted that McCleskey differed in one 
important aspect from earlier cases. McClesky's claim was the "first to 
base a challenge not on speculation about how a system might operate, 
but on empirical documentation of how it does operate."18 
The multiple regression analysis used in the Baldus study produced 
data that describes "the risk" of impermissible factors influencing sen-
tencing. Modern empirical science no longer relies on the assumption of 
"but for" causation or "cause in fact." This assumption had been consis-
tent with the Newtonian view that an absolute causal connection could 
be deduced between events. The modern concept of "causal tendency" 
is, however, based on the view of contemporary science, particularly in 
physics and epidemiology, that we can only determine the chances (or 
risk) of a causal connection through inductive reasoning. 19 The Court's 
insistence on a requirement of "but for" cause means that modern empir-
ical studies that quantify risk are irrelevant to this kind of constitutional 
decision making. Ironically, such evidence is best suited to identify insti-
tutional effects on aggregates of people and to isolate impermissible fac-
tors that account for these effects. 20 
Justice Brennan also considered the Baldus study in its proper con-
text: "Evaluation of McCleskey's evidence cannot rest solely on the 
numbers themselves. We must also ask whether the conclusion sug-
gested by those numbers is consonant with our understanding of history 
and human experience."21 He then reviewed the dual system of criminal 
punishment based on race that had been historically documented in the 
16. [d. at 308. 
17. [d. at 323-24. 
18. [d. at 324. 
19. The legal concept of causal tendency or causal linkage in tort law was developed by Profes-
sor Guido Calabresi. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Henry 
Kalven. Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975). 
20. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 327. 
21. [d. at 328. 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He concluded that this history was 
consistent with the quantitative findings of the Baldus study. 22 
Justice Brennan intuitively used a technique routinely employed by 
biostatisticians and epidemiologists to determine causality. An isolated 
empirical study cannot establish causality. Rather, it is important to ex-
amine the study's findings in light of known facts such as biological plau-
sibility and consistency with previous findings. 23 Even from a purely 
scientific view, the context of the empirical study is important to under-
stand in order to determine its true significance. 
In both Edwards and McCleskey, Justice Brennan emphasized the 
importance of scientific knowledge and the value of considering the 
knowledge in its proper context. These understandings permeate his 
other opinions as well, including Craig v. Boren24 and Cruzan v. Missouri 
Department of Public Health. 25 
I believe that these insights of Justice Brennan are important and 
will prevail. Our institutional responses should be shaped by both scien-
tific and social knowledge. Large scale empirical studies are being con-
ducted in increasing numbers because they provide valuable information 
about the effects of social institutions and conditions on aggregates of 
people. Otherwise unavailable information about the competencies and 
failings of institutions is gained because of statistical analysis. However, 
as Justice Brennan has suggested, it is important to consider scientific 
knowledge and evidence in a social context. While the scientific culture 
emphasizes "provability," the legal culture has a somewhat different fo-
cus-"persuasiveness." To assign social worth to scientific knowledge 
and to determine its legal significance requires that scientific information 
be considered in light of its social context. 
Thus, Justice Brennan has treated scientific information as but a 
piece of the puzzle when interpreting the Constitution. This is copsistent 
with his larger view of constitutional interpretation. He believes that 
constitutional interpretation cannot be based on "pure reason."26 He has 
insisted that: 
The struggle for certainty, for confidence in one's interpretive effort, is 
real and persistent. Although we may never achieve certainty, we 
must continue in the struggle, for it is only as each generation brings to 
22. Id. at 329-33. 
23. C. HENNEKENS & J. BURING, EPIDEMIOLOGY IN MEDICINE 40-41 (1987). 
24. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). A statute prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of21, and 
females under the age of 18, was struck down based on gender discrimination. Id. at 203. 
25. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)(Brennan, J., dissenting). A state may require a clear and convincing 
evidence standard in proceedings in which a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration 
of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 2852. 
26. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," Lecture by Justice William 
Brennan, before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Sept. 17, 1987). 
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bear its experience and understanding, its passion and reason, that 
there is hope for progress in the law.27 
Scientific knowledge and evidence may contribute to the reasoning 
process and, as in the case of McCleskey, even invoke the passion neces-
sary in constitutional interpretation. Justice Brennan strongly believes 
that our vision of the Constitution must be based not only on rationality, 
but also on decency and fairness. 
Justice Brennan's expansive influenC(e on modern constitutional law 
can be explained in a number of ways: his passion and rationality; his 
creative intellect and encyclopedic memory; his personal warmth and 
sense of community with the rest of the Court; his work ethic and eternal 
optimism. But in my view, the best explanation for his influence is his 
social and scientific insight into the human condition and his powerful 
persuasiveness, a consequent redefinition of civil liberty. 
27. [d. 
